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1. Introduction   
  This paper addresses an important, but neglected, question, namely the relationship between 
the volatility of growth and the distribution of factor income.  The importance of this issue stems 
from the fact that who bears the cost of the volatility is likely to have important consequences for the 
overall performance of the economy, particularly in a developing economy where opportunities for 
insurance may be limited. The empirical evidence on the relationship between volatility and the 
distribution of factor income is sparse.  Breen and García-Peñalosa (2000) obtain a positive 
relationship between a country’s volatility (measured by the standard deviation of the rate of GDP 
growth) and income inequality.  To the extent that greater inequality is likely to be associated with a 
higher share of income to capital, these findings suggest that more volatility will be associated with a 
smaller share of income being earned by labor.  
A simple regression equation shows that this is indeed the case. Using a sample of 83 
developed and developing countries, we measure volatility by the standard deviation of the annual 
growth rate of per capita GDP over the period 1960-90, and compute the average labor share over 
the same period. Regressing labor share on volatility, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in 
volatility reduces labor share by 2.36 percentage points.1  This is a sizable effect, with an increase of 
one standard deviation of volatility reducing the labor share by a third of its standard deviation, and 
raises the question of how risk affects the shares of output commanded by capital and labor. 
  In general, the distribution of factor income and growth volatility are endogenously 
determined and thus need to be analyzed within an integrated intertemporal general equilibrium 
framework.  We employ an extension of the stochastic growth model developed by Grinols and 
Turnovsky (1993, 1998), Smith (1996), Corsetti (1997) and Turnovsky (2000).  This is a one-sector 
growth model, in which aggregate equilibrium output evolves in accordance with a stochastic AK 
technology.  Previous studies have been incapable of analyzing the impact of volatility on income 
                                                 
1 The labor share is defined as compensation of employees paid by resident producers, divided by GDP, both from the 
UN National Accounts. The data on volatility is from the Penn World Table. The sample contains 83 developed and 
developing economies for which both data where available. Regressing, LS, on volatility, SD, we find LS = 57.54 – 2.36 
SD, with a t-statistic for the coefficient on SD of –3.40, and R
2 = 0.125. Regressing the labor share in 1990 on volatility 
over the period 1960-90 yields an even stronger negative relationship, although the sample is smaller. 2 
distribution.  This is because either they abstract from labor [Grinols and Turnovsky 1993, 1998, 
Smith 1996] or alternatively, are based on a Cobb-Douglas production function [Corsetti 1997, 
Turnovsky 2000], in which case the factor distribution of income remains fixed.   
To allow volatility to influence distribution we need both endogenous employment levels and 
a production structure that allows for non-constant factor shares.  One of the more striking facts 
when we examine the evidence on output volatility is that developing economies are subject to much 
greater fluctuations in their growth rates than are industrial countries. We therefore study a two-
sector economy with a modern and a traditional sector, in which agents allocate their labor between 
the two sectors and where the overall factor shares depend, among other things, on the endogenous 
sizes of the two sectors.  Adopting this framework, the equilibrium growth rate, its volatility, and the 
distribution of income become jointly determined.  The relationship between growth and its 
volatility has been subject to both theoretical and empirical investigation.  The simplest stochastic 
growth model yields a negative tradeoff (as some of the more recent empirical evidence suggests) if 
and only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than unity, inconsistent with the evidence.  
Other more complex models, involving portfolio adjustments, are capable of generating a negative 
tradeoff under more plausible assumptions on preferences.  The implications for income distribution 
provide a further dimension to this relationship, and indeed, the elasticity of substitution between the 
capital and labor is an important determinant of the growth-volatility tradeoff. 
  Our analysis has two aspects.  First, we derive the equilibrium balanced growth path.  The 
economy we consider has a modern sector, in which output is produced by a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function, using both private capital and labor, and a traditional sector 
in which individuals are self-employed and output is produced using only labor. In both sectors the 
aggregate capital stock provides an externality that is consistent with an equilibrium of ongoing 
growth, as in Romer (1986).   
The equilibrium we derive provides a framework for considering the options available to the 
policy maker to offset the effects of volatility. In doing so we make the crucial assumption that the 
government cannot tax the traditional sector. Given our interest in the effects of risk in a developing 
economy this seems a natural assumption.  In such economies the bulk of self-employment is found 3 
within what is often called the “informal sector”, and estimates of the proportion of the male non-
agricultural labor force in that sector range between 15 and 90%, depending on the country.2  It is 
often argued that the production structure of the economy, and in particular the degree to which 
certain activities are commercialized as opposed to black-market or subsistence-oriented, is a major 
determinant of the capacity of governments to raise tax revenue.  To capture this feature of 
developing economies we simply assume that all traditional sector employment is informal, taking 
place outside the formal labor market and consequently is non-taxable by the government.  
This policy constraint allows us to address two questions. First, it makes the tax on labor 
income a tool that can be used to counteract the impact of increased volatility.  Because only one of 
the sectors is taxed, changing the wage tax affects the allocation of labor across sectors, and 
consequently partially offsets the impact of increased volatility on employment.  Second, the policy 
constraint allows us to consider the effect of redistributing the tax burden from labor to capital on 
growth and welfare.  This is an important question.  In many developing countries interest income, if 
taxed at all, is taxed at a rate below the labor income tax rate (see Tanzi and Zee, 2001).  This not 
only implies a regressive tax structure,3 but may also be inefficient in a representative agent 
framework.  Moreover, as developing countries attempt to become fully integrated in the world 
economy they need both a higher tax level and a reduction of their reliance on foreign trade taxation.  
This will require higher personal income tax rates, and raises the question of the form that this 
increase in taxation should take. 
Formal analysis is intractable and the second phase of our analysis is to calibrate the model to 
a developing economy.  In this respect the model is capable of replicating the equilibria of a range of 
such economies with relative ease.  In general we find that the relationship between volatility and 
factor shares is complex, depending upon both the sectoral source of the productive risk and the 
elasticity of substitution in production.  Two main policy conclusions are obtained. First, attempting 
to stabilize aggregate volatility at its original level following an increase in risk is infeasible 
requiring a wage tax well in excess of 100%.  The welfare loss can, however, be fully eliminated, 
                                                 
2 See United Nations (2000) and Thomas (1992). 
3 It is well documented that in many developing countries the tax structure is far from progressive. See Jiminez (1986). 4 
and by a suitable adjustment of the tax rates on both labor and capital income it is possible to 
maintain both factor shares and welfare at their original levels. Second, we find that the second-best 
optimal tax policy response is to set the wage tax below the capital income tax.  In other words, 
when the government is constrained in its capacity to tax all labor incomes, the standard first-best 
result that taxing labor is preferable to taxing capital income no longer holds.4  Moreover, optimal 
policy exhibits a tradeoff between growth and welfare maximization.   
The literature on this topic is sparse.  The study of distribution in developing countries has 
been concerned mainly with examining Kuznets’ hypothesis that as an economy grows, migration 
from agriculture to industry entails changes in the personal distribution of income. Recent work on 
this dual economy model has shown the complexity of the relationship between development and 
inequality, but even when unemployment is introduced the assumption of risk-neutrality has meant 
that risk and uncertainty has played no role.5  Our approach departs from this literature in various 
respects.  First, our setup is not strictly a dual economy model, as we do not consider migration, but 
rather the way in which individuals (or households) divide their time between two types of activities.  
Second, instead of examining how growth affects inequality, we argue that both distribution and the 
growth rate are endogenously determined by a number of factors, including the riskiness of the 
economy.6  Lastly, we focus on the factor rather than the personal distribution of income. 
The paper closest to our work, at least in spirit, is Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), who 
find that greater inequality is associated with more volatility.  They show how combining capital 
market imperfections with inequality in a two-sector model can generate endogenous fluctuations in 
output and investment.  In their model it is unequal access to investment opportunities and the gap 
between the returns to investment in the modern and the traditional sectors that cause fluctuations.  
We reverse the focus, examining how exogenous production uncertainty determines output volatility 
and distribution. 
                                                 
4 See Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and the work they discuss for an analysis of the effects of shifting the tax burden in an 
endogenous growth model. 
5 See, e.g., Fields (1980), Bourguignon (1990), and Anand and Kanbur (1993), for analyses of the Kuznets hypothesis 
where either inequality within sectors or relative prices change along the development path. Temple (1999) examined the 
evolution of inequality as an economy grows in a dual economy model with unemployment in the modern sector.   
6 Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001) also address the question of how growth and distribution are simultaneously 
determined in developing economies, but the focus of that paper is innovation and the accumulation of human capital. 5 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the components of the 
model, while section 3 summarizes the implied macroeconomic equilibrium.  We then provide some 
initial analytical results in Section 4. Section 5 undertakes the calibration, first computing the 
numerical impacts of increases in the exogenous risk on the key economic variables, and then 
computing the appropriate policy responses.  The next section considers second-best optimal policy, 
obtaining the tax rates that maximize growth and welfare. Section 7 concludes, while the technical 
solution to the problem – itself quite a challenging exercise – is relegated to the Appendix. 
2.  Elements of the Economy 
  This section describes the analytical framework and the behavior of the relevant agents.  In 
developing the model we distinguish between quantities that pertain to and are chosen by the 
representative agent, and corresponding economy-wide average quantities, denoted by bars, that the 
individual takes as given, but which in equilibrium are endogenously determined. 
2.1  Technology and Returns 
  We assume that the representative agent supplies a unit of labor inelastically.  A fraction, 
1− l, may be allocated to employment in a formal or modern sector, with the remainder, l, being 
spent in an informally organized sector.  Output in the formal sector is produced by the CES 
production function:  
    ()
1
( 1 )( 1 ) () () dY B l K K dt du Z dt du
ρ ρ ρ αα
− − −  =− + − + ≡ +

   0 < α < 1,  −1< ρ <∞    (1a)  
where K denotes the individual firm's stock of capital, K  is the average economy-wide stock of 
capital, so that (1 ) lK −  measures individual labor in efficiency units.  This is a generalization of the 
stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function employed by Corsetti (1997) and Turnovsky (2000), 
with the elasticity of substitution defined by ε ≡ 1( 1+ ρ).  The stochastic variable, du, is temporally 
independent and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σu
2dt over the instant dt.  This 
stochastic production function exhibits constant returns to scale in the private decisions, the fraction 
of time devoted to employment in the formal sector, and the private capital stock.  In addition, the 6 
average stock of capital yields an externality such that in equilibrium, when KK = , the production 
function is linear in the accumulating stock of capital, as in Romer (1986).  Letting  
    
1
() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ll
ρ ρ αα
− −   Ω≡ − + −    
Aggregate (average) output, dY , is thus represented by: 
  
1
( 1 ) ( 1 )() ( ) () dY B l K dt du B l K dt du
ρ ρ αα
− −  =− + − + ≡ Ω +     (1b) 
  Factor returns over the period (t, t+dt) are generated as follows.  The wage rate (return to 
labor) is described by the stochastic process 
    dA = a(dt + du)       ( 2 a )  
where        ()
1( 1 )
, (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
llKK aZ l Bl l Kl K
ρρ αδ
+− +
== ≡∂ ∂ − = Ω − ≡  
Likewise, the private rate of return on capital, dRK, over the period (t, t+dt) is specified by: 
     () KK dR r dt du =+        ( 2 b )  
where    ()
1
1
, (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) K llKK rZ K B l B l
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ∂∂ α α α α
+
− − +
==  ≡= − − + − ≡ − Ω   
Equations (2a) and (2b) assume that the returns to capital and labor are represented by their 
respective aggregate stochastic marginal physical products.  Equations (2a) and (2b) imply that the 
rate of return to capital is stationary, while over time the wage rate grows with the aggregate capital 
stock.7  The stochastic shock in the formal sector is reflected proportionately in both factor returns. 
  Output in the informal sector depends upon labor in accordance with the production function 
      () dQ qlK dt dv =+       ( 3 a )  
where the aggregate capital stock serves as a proxy for knowledge that conditions the productivity of 
                                                 
7 Together (2a) and (2b) imply (1 ) ( ) ( ) K ld A K d R B lKd t d u d Y −+ = Ω + =  7 
individual labor.  For simplicity we assume that labor has constant productivity, parameterized by q.8 
The production function also includes the assumption that unlike labor, individual capital cannot 
move between the two sectors.  This is a reasonable first approximation for a developing economy in 
which banks are unlikely to lend to finance investment in the informal sector, as well as because the 
“types” or “vintages” of capital are different. The stochastic disturbance in the informal sector, dv, is 
temporally independent and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σv
2dt over the instant 
dt.  The correlation between the two shocks is σuvdt .  Aggregate output in the informal sector is 
      () dQ qlK dt dv =+       ( 3 b )  
  In addition to holding capital, the agent may hold government bonds, b, the before-tax real 
rate of return on which is postulated to be  
     dRB ≡ r Bdt + duB       ( 4 )  
where rB and duB, will be determined endogenously in macroeconomic equilibrium.  The bonds we 
shall consider have an endogenously-determined variable price P, but beyond that their precise 
nature is unimportant.  Equilibrium asset pricing considerations will determine rB and duB in terms 
of the real shocks, du, dv to the economy, with P adjusting to support this equilibrium.  
2.2 Consumer  Optimization 
  The representative consumer’s asset holdings are subject to the wealth constraint 
    W = Pb + K        ( 5 )  
where W denotes real wealth.  In addition, the agent is assumed to purchase output over the instant dt 
at the non-stochastic rate C(t)dt out of income generated by these asset holdings.  His objective is to 
select his portfolio of assets and the rate of consumption to maximize expected lifetime utility, taken 
to depend upon consumption, C(t), as represented by the isoelastic utility function 
                                                 
8 It is straightforward and changes little if we assume that labor interacts with a fixed factor land, T say, in accordance 
with the production function 
1 () dQ ql T K dt dv
θθ − =+  8 
    0 0
1
       1
t EC e d t
γβ γ
γ
∞ − −∞< < ∫       ( 6 )  
subject to the wealth constraint, (5), and the stochastic wealth accumulation equation: 
    [ ] (1 ) BB KK dW W n dR n dR l dA Cdt dT =+ + − − −     (7) 
where:nB ≡ Pb W  is the share of portfolio held in government bonds, nK ≡ K W the share of 
portfolio held in capital; and dT  taxes paid.   
  The government is assumed to tax income from capital and labor generating the aggregate 
flow of tax revenues 
    () ( 1 ) () KK K W W dT r K dt du l K dt du ττ δ ττ ′′ =+ + −+     (8) 
where we assume that only the formal sector is taxed.  This specification allows for different tax 
rates on capital and wage income, as well as on the deterministic and stochastic components of each.  
Different values for  ,   and  , K KW W τ ττ τ ′′  reflect the possibility that taxes might include offset 
provisions having the effect of reducing the degree of after-tax randomness of real returns.  Without 
loss of generality, interest income is untaxed; the before-tax return adjusting to satisfy the 
equilibrium arbitrage conditions. 
 Substituting  for  ni into (5) and for (2a, 2b), (4) and (8) into (7), the stochastic optimization 
problem can be expressed as choosing the consumption-wealth ratio, C W, and the portfolio shares, 
nito maximize expected intertemporal utility (6) subject to 
[] (1 ) (1 )(1 ) BB K K K W K
C
dW n r n r W l ql n W dt Wdw
W
ττ δ
  =+ − − + − − + +    
   (9a) 
    nB + nK = 1        ( 9 b )  
where for convenience we denote the stochastic component of dW W  by 
  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ln KK K W K BB K
WW
dw n r l n du n du q dv
WW
ττ δ
 ′′ ≡− + − − + + 

    ( 9 c )  
In performing the optimization, the agent takes the rates of return of the assets, and the relevant 9 
variances and covariances as given, although these will ultimately be determined in equilibrium. 
  Through the equilibrium wage rate, the individual's rate of wealth accumulation depends 
upon aggregate wealth, which accumulates as follows: 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) BB K K K w K
C




 =+ − − + − − + +   
   
(9a') 
   (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) KK W K B B K dw r l n du n du qln dv ττ δ ′′  ≡− + − − + +      (9c') 
This renders the agent's optimization a two-state variable problem, the two states being the agent's 
individual wealth, W, which is under his direct control, and the aggregate stock of wealth, W , the 
evolution of which follows (9b') and (9c'), and which the individual takes as exogenous.  But even 
though from the individual’s point of view there are two state variables, since all agents are identical, 
with aggregate and individual shocks being identical and perfectly correlated, in the macroeconomic 
equilibrium the two state variables evolve proportionately [WW = ].  Thus along the equilibrium 
growth path the dynamic evolution of the economy can be represented by a single state variable.9 
2.3 Government  Policy 
  Government policy is restrictive, its sole purpose being to respond to changes in the sectoral 
volatilities.  For this purpose it levies taxes and issues debt subject to its flow budget constraint: 
    d(Pb)= (Pb)dRB − dT      ( 1 0 )  
It is straightforward to introduce stochastic government expenditure, which may or may not be 
productive, as in Turnovsky (1999), but this is unnecessary for present purposes.  
2.4  Goods Market Equilibrium 
  Finally, the flow of physical goods in the economy to consumption, investment, and 
government expenditure must satisfy the resource constraint 
                                                 
9As we will discuss in Section 3.1 below and further in the Appendix, the equilibrium is the continuous-time analogue to 
the “recursive competitive equilibrium” concept defined by Stokey and Lucas (1989).  10 
    dY + dQ= dC + dK       ( 1 1 )  
which using (1), (11a), and dC = C(t)dt implies that the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation 
(rate of growth) in the economy is 
    () ()
K
dK C




=Ω+− + Ω + ≡ + 

. (12) 
3. Macroeconomic  Equilibrium 
  The solution of the model is derived in the Appendix.  This is based on the assumption that 
the equilibrium is a recurring one, in which risks and returns on assets are unchanging through time.  
This implies that the agent chooses the same allocation of portfolio wealth at each instant of time.  
Since all agents are identical we drop the distinction between individuals and the aggregate by 
dropping the bars.  The equilibrium is summarized by the stochastic growth path defined below.  
3.1   Equilibrium Growth Path 
Definitions of δ,Ω,r K,φ  
    δ = BαΩ
1+ρ(1− l)
−(1+ρ)       ( 1 3 a )  
    
1
(1 ) (1 ) l
ρ ρ αα
− −  Ω= − + −        (13b) 
    
1 (1 ) K rB
ρ α
+ =− Ω        ( 1 3 c )  
    φ = r B(1− nK)+ r K(1− τK)nK      (13d) 
Equilibrium Labor Allocation 
  
22 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( (1 ) WW u W u v v qB B l q q l δ τγ δ τ σ δ τ σ σ ′′   −− = − Ω − − Ω −− −   (13e) 
Equilibrium Portfolio Allocation 
()
22 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
1
K
BK K w u u v K KW K K
K
n
rr B q l r l r
n
τγ σσ σ τ τ δ τ
    ′′ ′ =− + − + Ω + + − −−    −    
  (13f) 11 
Consumer Budget Constraint 




ψ φτ δ =+ − −+ −       (13g) 
Goods Market Equilibrium 









       (13h) 
Equilibrium Volatility 
    ()
0.5 222 2 22 2 wu u v v BB q l q l σσσ σ =Ω+ Ω +      (13i) 
Equilibrium Growth Rate 
 






−  ′ =− Ω − − − − Ω  − 
 
  
22 2 (2 ) (1 )(1 )
2
K WW K u v K v B nn q l n q l
ρ γ
γ ττ α σ σ  ′′  −Ω − − + − − Ω + −   
  (13j) 
  This system characterizes a recursive competitive equilibrium that holds along a balanced 
growth path.  In this respect, the solution procedure is the continuous-time analogue to the recursive 
competitive equilibrium concept defined by Stokey and Lucas (1989) and others.  It is well known 
that for the constant elasticity utility function and stochastic labor income, it is in general impossible 
to derive an explicit closed-form expression for the consumption function.10  Nevertheless, despite 
this, using the equilibrium conditions (13) one can determine an equilibrium relationship between 
consumption and wealth, one that holds along the balanced growth path. 
The equilibrium has the following recursive structure.  The first four equations repeat the 
definitions of the equilibrium output –capital ratio, the wage-rate, the return to capital, which are all 
functions of the labor allocation decision, l, and the average return on asset income,φ.  The first 
critical equilibrium equation is the labor allocation condition, (13e).  This asserts that labor is 
allocated such that the risk-adjusted after-tax returns to labor in the two sectors are equal.  Having 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Blanchard and Mankiw (1988). 12 
thus determined l yields δ, Ω, rK, and in turn the volatility of the growth rate, σw, along the 
equilibrium growth path.  The consumer budget constraint, goods market equilibrium, the 
equilibrium portfolio allocation condition, and the equilibrium growth condition, then jointly 
determine  nK,ψ,C W,rB .  Equation (13f) further reveals how the before-tax return on bonds adjusts 
to yield the equilibrium after-tax rate of return, so that the real growth equilibrium is independent of 
the tax rates on interest income. 
3.2  Initial Prices and Wealth Effects 
  The equilibrium growth path (13) describes a stable rational expectations equilibrium.  As in 
any such equilibrium, its attainment, or the shift from one equilibrium to another resulting from a 
structural change, is brought about by an appropriate initial jump in the price of bonds,P(0).  To the 
extent that the representative agent holds bonds in his equilibrium portfolio, these jumps impose 
initial capital gains or losses, thereby affecting initial wealth.  With K evolving continuously in 
accordance with the stochastic process, (12), the initial stock at time 0, K0is predetermined.  Given 
constant portfolio shares, the initial dollar value of government bonds outstanding is determined by11 
     ( ) 00 (0) BK Pb n nK = ;       
Thus given b0 and K0, any policy that generates a change in the relative portfolio shares, nB nK , 
will lead to a jump in the initial market value of bonds,P(0)b0.  The corresponding initial wealth, 
W(0), of the agent is thus 
     ( ) 0 (0) 1 K Wn K = .        ( 1 4 )  
3.3 Feasibility  of  Equilibrium 
  Finally, the equilibrium must satisfy certain feasibility conditions.  First is the transversality 
condition, which for the constant elasticity utility function is of the form:12    
                                                 
11These equations hold at all points of time, including 0.  Given the constancy of portfolio shares, they are the source of 
the proportionality of the stochastic growth rates summarized in equation (A.20). 
12The utility function (as a function of wealth) can be shown to be of the form ϕW
γ . 13 





 =  .        ( 1 5 )  
Using (13), condition (15) can be shown to be a generalization of the condition C W > 0, originally 
due to Merton (1969), to which it reduces in the absence of labor income.13  With the equilibrium 
being one of balanced real growth, in which all real assets grow at the same rate, (15) also implies 
that the intertemporal government budget constraint is met.  One can show that (15) automatically 
holds for the logarithmic utility function (γ = 0).  In other cases, this condition may impose 
restrictions in order for the tax rate to remain feasible.  But provided (15) holds, the equilibrium is 
viable in the sense of being consistent with the intertemporal solvency of the government. 
  Second, with nonnegative stock of capital in existence, the equilibrium portfolio 
sharesnK ≥ 0.  This inequality impose further restrictions on government policy.  If the government 
is permitted to borrow and lend then no restriction on nB is imposed.  However, if such lending to 
the private sector is ruled out, the additional restriction nB ≥ 0, or 1≥ nK is required to be met.14    
  The third condition is associated with the endogeneity of the fraction of time allocated to the 
two forms of labor.  This requires that the solution for l from the labor allocation condition (13e) lies 
in the range 0 ≤ l ≤1.  For the CES production function the restrictions involved are hard to establish 
analytically, although our numerical simulations always yield an interior solution. 
3.4 Distributional  Measures 
  The focus of our study is on the tradeoff between the mean growth rate, ψ , its volatility, σw, 
and the behavior of relative factor shares, a key determinant of which is the relative size of the 
formal to the informal sector.  In general this is summarized by the stochastic quantity 
   
()
() ()
dY B dt du
dY dQ B dt du ql dt dv
Ω+
=
+Ω + + +
    ( 1 6 )  
For convenience we shall consider the deterministic quantity 
                                                 
13This is derived for a simpler (Cobb-Douglas, one-sector) version of the present model by Turnovsky (2000). 
14The equilibrium in which the portfolio share of government bonds nB = 0 is one in which there are no outside bonds.  
Such an equilibrium still allows for the presence of inside bonds that are perfect substitutes for government bonds. 14 









      ( 1 6 ’ )  
which can be easily seen to be an increasing function of the labor allocated to the formal sector.15  
  In looking at factor shares we want to make a distinction between what we will call the 
“wage” share and the “labor” share. By the former we denote the share of formal-sector output 
earned by labor in that sector. We define it as  












      ( 1 7 a )  
and is non-stochastic. The labor share is defined as the overall share of labor income in total GNP,  
     





and in general is stochastic.  For convenience, we shall focus on the non-stochastic quantity 
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     (17b) 
which is a weighted average of the share of labor in the formal sector (SW) and in the informal sector 
(1).  The distinction between these two measures of distribution is important given that one of the 
sectors in our economy is informal. By definition, labor incomes generated by this sector will not 
appear in the national accounts, and as a result any attempt to confront the predictions of the model 
with the data would need to consider the “measured” share of labor, i.e.SW. 
In general, SW increases with labor in the formal sector if and only ε > 1, and in the case of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, SW = α. The impact of labor allocation on the labor share is  
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The first component reflects the impact in the formal sector and depends upon ε, while the latter 
                                                 
15 The quantity in (16’) can be seen to be the “zero-order” component in a Taylor expansion of  () dY dY dQ +  about its 
mean.  Performing the expansion while recalling the assumption that dY  and dQ are uncorrelated, the expression for θ 
given in (16’) will be a reasonably accurate estimate of the mean of (16) as long as the difference between the relative 
volatilities of the two outputs, expressed as var( ) ( ), var( ) ( ) dY E dY dQ E dQ , respectively is not too great. 15 
reflects the fact that with labor being the only (direct) factor of production in the informal sector, a 
shift in labor from the formal sector raises the overall share of labor income.  Hence, SLincreases in 
l even if the production function in the formal sector is Cobb-Douglas.   
Given the stochastic specifications (2a) and (2b), the relative volatility of labor income, 
capital income, and output of the formal sector all equal σu.16  The volatility of overall output is  
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while the volatility of the overall labor share of output is 
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3.5. Welfare 
  To assess the consequences of policy on economic welfare, we consider the welfare of the 
representative agent as specified by the intertemporal utility function (6) evaluated along the 
equilibrium path.  By definition, this equals the value function used to solve the intertemporal 
optimization problem. 
  It can be shown that for the constant elasticity utility function the optimized level of utility, 
starting from an initial stock of wealth, W(0), and computed in this way is given by 
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Using the relationship (14) the welfare criterion (19) can be expressed as 
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where  ,  K CW n  are obtained from (13).  Assuming that these solutions are all positive and that the 
transversality condition is met so that the denominator is positive, implies that  0 ()0 XK γ > . 
                                                 
16 Since income from capital is derived from only the formal sector, its volatility is independent of the informal sector. 16 
4.  Some Analytical Properties 
  In general, formal analysis of the equilibrium (13) is intractable, and we shall resort to 
numerical simulations.  Despite that, a number of observations can be drawn from the structure.   
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      (20b) 
An increase in the production risk in the formal sector, σu, causes labor to move toward the informal 
sector, while greater production risk in the informal sector, σv, has the opposite effect.  An increase 
in the deterministic component of the wage tax (levied only in the formal sector) causes labor to shift 
away from that sector.  But an increase in the stochastic component of the wage tax reduces the 
volatility of net labor income and has the reverse effect. In contrast, labor allocation is invariant with 
respect to both the deterministic and stochastic components of the tax on capital income. 
  The response of the labor allocation is a critical element of the impact of risk on volatility.  
The effects of an increase in the volatility of production in the formal and informal sectors, given the 
covariances between the two shocks, are respectively: 
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Consider an increase in σu.  The direct effect is to raise volatility by an amount that depends upon 
the output-capital ratio, BΩ, in the formal sector.  In addition, by causing labor to shift away from 
that sector, it has a secondary effect, which will reinforce or offset the first effect depending upon (i) 
the relative volatility and (ii) the relative output-capital ratios in the two sectors.   
One issue that has received substantial attention in the literature concerns the impact of 
volatility on growth.  Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed.  Ramey and Ramey (1995) present 17 
evidence to suggest that volatility has a negative impact on the mean growth rate, though this 
contrasts with the earlier findings of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), for example.  The simplest one-
sector stochastic growth model implies a positive relationship if and only if the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion exceeds unity, as the empirical evidence strongly suggests.  The present two-sector 
portfolio model is somewhat more ambiguous in this regard.  The direct effect of an increase in 
volatility in either sector, given by the coefficient of σu
2 or σv
2 in (13j), is positive, as long asγ < 0.  
An increase in σu
2 will tend to move the resources employed in the formal sector to the informal 
sector and the net of effect of this on the overall volatility and growth will depend upon the relative 
volatility of the two sectors.  In addition, the higher volatility σu
2 will affect the mean return and thus 
the mean growth rate.  The relationship between volatility and growth is thus a complex one and 
further insight into this issue will be provided by the numerical analysis in Section 5 below. 
A key issue upon which we wish to focus concerns the impact of volatility on the factor 
shares.  Recalling the definitions of SW,SL in (17), we see that these depend entirely upon the 
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Equation (22a) is conventional.  An increase in employment in the formal sector (decrease in l), 
brought about by a reduction in σu , say, will raise the share of labor in the income of the formal 
sector if and only if the elasticity of substitution in that sector is greater than one. With the absence 
of private capital in the informal sector, any increase in employment in that sector will raise the 
overall share of labor income.  Thus, if ε > 1, it is possible for SW and SL to respond in opposite 
ways to an increase in volatility, and an example of this is provided in our numerical simulations. 
4.1  Some Policy Implications 
  The structure of the equilibrium (13) has important implications for the options available to 18 
the policymaker to respond to an increase in the sectoral production volatilities, σu,σ v.  From these 
conditions we may solve for the following key variables in the form: 
     () ,,, uv W W ll σ στ τ ′ =        ( 2 3 a )  
     ( ) ,, ,,, ww u v u v W W l σσ σ σσ σ τ τ ′ =         (23b) 
     ( ) ,,, WW u v W W SS l σσττ ′ =           ( 2 3 c )  
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The first observation is that the labor shares, SW,SL, and the aggregate volatility, σw, are controlled 
by choosing the sectoral labor allocation, l.  This in turn can be accomplished by setting a linear 
combination of the tax rates on the deterministic and stochastic components of wage income.   
Indeed, this can be achieved by setting the tax rate on all labor income uniformly.17  Note further that 
the tax on capital income is irrelevant insofar as stabilizing these quantities is concerned.  Taxes on 
capital may, however, play an important role in controlling the mean growth rate. 
  Consider an increase in the volatility, dσu, in the formal sector.  This will cause labor to 
move from the formal to the informal sector.  From (23a), (23c) we see that the sectoral labor 
allocation, and thus labor shares, will be stabilized if the tax on the deterministic component of labor 
income is reduced, or the tax on the stochastic component is increased, by the respective amounts: 
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In either case the overall volatility of the growth rate increases by the direct amount () ( ) uw B σ σ Ω .  
  Alternatively, the policy maker may choose to set the tax rate on labor income to stabilize the 
aggregate volatility.  This can be achieved by setting  
                                                 
17 Note that it is impossible to set SW  or SL  and σ w simultaneously. 19 
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which is almost certainly positive (certainly in the simulations).  This implies that the labor share 
will adjust by the (almost certainly positive) amount 












     ( 2 6 )  
There is thus a tradeoff between the amount of the adjustment due to a change in dσu that is borne 
by the aggregate volatility and the amount that is borne by the factor shares.   
  A similar type of tradeoff applies in response to a change in the volatility, dσv, in the 
informal sector.  In fact, our simulations show that seeking to stabilize the aggregate volatility, dσw, 
would be a disastrous policy, since it implies an astronomical increase in the wage tax, leading to a 
catastrophic decline in welfare.  Indeed, for our chosen parameter set it is infeasible, requiring a tax 
rate well in excess of 100%! 
  Lastly, we may note that the impact of an increase in volatility dσu on the mean growth rate 
can be offset in several ways.  It can either be accommodated by an adjustment in the tax on labor 
income, or if that has been committed to some other objective, by adjusting the tax on capital 
income.  Again our simulations show that seeking to stabilize the mean growth rate is very 
undesirable from a welfare point of view. 
5. Calibration 
  To obtain further insight we resort to numerical simulations.  These are based on the 
following parameter values that we take to be representative of a range of developing economies: 
 
Preference parameters:          γ = -1.5, β = 0.04 
Production parameters:         α = 0.6, B = 0.4,q = 0.275 
Elasticity of substitution       ε = 0.5, 1, 2  
Sectoral Risk Parameters     
σu = 0, 0.125, 0.25;
σv = 0, 0.125, 0.25;
 
Tax rates:                              τK = 0.20, ′  τ  K = 0.20, τW = 0.20, ′  τ  W = 0.20 20 
The preference parameters are standard.  They correspond to a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 2.5 and a rate of time preference of 4%.  The production elasticity α = 0.6 implies that 
the share of labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function is 60%. The parameters B,q are arbitrary 
scale parameters, which play a big role in determining the equilibrium allocation of labor.  The 
values of ε correspond to low, medium, and high elasticity of substitution, while the values for the 
σu, σ v correspond to zero, medium (12.5%) and high (25%) sectoral risk; see Gavin and Hausmann 
(1995).  The percentage of household income paid in taxes varies widely across countries and across 
income groups within a country, most of the time falling between 15 and 25% for developing 
countries; see Jimenez (1986). 
5.1 Equilibrium 
The equilibria are summarized in the panels of Tables 1a and 1b, which correspond to a low 
elasticity of substitution, the Cobb-Douglas, and a high elasticity of substitution. Part a of the table 
summarizes the equilibrium values pertaining to income distribution; sectoral labor allocation, the 
relative size of the formal sector, labor shares in the formal sector and in aggregate, and the output-
capital ratio.  Part b summarizes the growth rate, volatility measures and the welfare effects.  In bold 
type we identify the benchmark case.  This corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with medium degrees of sectoral volatilities σu = 0.125, σ v = 0.125. 
Welfare is measured as percentage “equivalent variations” in the initial capital stock, relative 
to this benchmark economy.  Thus, for example, increasing σu and σ v  from 0.125, and 0.125, to 
0.250, and 0.250, respectively, while leaving ε unchanged, leads to an overall welfare loss 
equivalent to a 1.97%  reduction in capital relative to the benchmark.  Subtracting the values of 
∆(X) also gives approximate losses for other economies.  Thus, for example, increasing σu from 
0.125 to 0.25, while holding σv and ε fixed at 0 and 0.5, respectively, will reduce welfare by 
approximately (7.07% - 2.73%) = 4.34%. 
Table 1 spans the range of plausible values and the following can be noted. In the benchmark 
economy of Cobb-Douglas and medium risk, 53.7% of labor is allocated to the formal sector, which 
produces about 70.9% of GDP.  Labor’s share of output is 60% in the formal sector and 71.6% 21 
overall.  The capital-output ratio is around 3.9.  The mean growth rate is 2.63%, with volatility 
4.19% and aggregate output volatility of around 9.6%.  These numbers are consistent with an 
“average” economy in the Gavin-Hausmann (1995) sample. 
The percentage of labor allocated to the informal sector varies between 27.1% and 69.4%.  
Correspondingly, the wage share and the labor share vary between 47.1% and 69.6% and between 
68.1% and 76.2%, respectively. For the Cobb-Douglas function SW is constant (0.6) but SL still 
varies in response to the sectoral labor allocation. The allocation of labor to the informal sector 
increases with the elasticity of substitution in the formal sector.  This is because an increase in ε 
reduces the marginal physical product of labor and therefore the wage rate paid in the formal sector, 
inducing labor to move away from it.  As a consequence, SWand SL both decrease with ε.   
The mean growth rate ψ  varies between 2.16% and 3.60%; the standard deviation (σw) of 
the growth rate varies between 0 and 9.0%.  The latter figure is consistent with the figures of Gavin 
and Hausmann (1995) for developing economies.  Overall volatility of GDP varies between 0 to 
around 20.5%, which is a plausible range for developing countries. The elasticity of substitution 
plays an important role. The mean growth rate increases with the elasticity of substitution, while all 
volatility measures decline with the elasticity of substitution. Greater flexibility in production allows 
for a more efficient use of resources, which increases the growth rate and has a stabilizing influence 
in the presence of risk. Lastly, welfare decreases with the elasticity of substitution if the degree of 
risk is small and it increases with the elasticity of substitution if the degree of risk is high.   
Intuitively, flexibility in production is more desirable in a riskier environment. 
5.2  Effects of Risk 
As we already saw analytically, the allocation of labor to the informal sector (l) increases 
with risk in the formal sector, σu, and decreases with risk in the informal sector,σv.  Its sensitivity to 
σv increases with the elasticity of substitution in the formal sector, since for high values of ε the 
fraction of labor allocated to the informal sector is relatively high. The relative size of the formal 
sector, θ, being a decreasing function of l, thus decreases with σu and increases with σv.   
The mean growth rate increases with both forms of risk.  It is more sensitive to risk in the 22 
formal sector than in the informal sector, as under our choice of parameters the former is larger.  
Volatility increases with both sources of sectoral risk.  As we already saw, high values of ε result in 
a large informal sector. Consequently the sensitivity of the mean and the volatility of growth to the 
risk in the formal sector decrease with the elasticity of substitution in the formal sector, while their 
sensitivity to the risk in the informal sector increases with ε.  
The relationship between risk and factor shares is complex. The wage share, SW, increases 
with σu if ε = 0.5 and increases with σu, if ε = 2. (It is unchanged for the Cobb-Douglas case). It 
decreases with σv if ε = 0.5 and increases with σv, if ε = 2.  Meanwhile, the overall share of labor, 
SL, increases with σu and decreases with σv for all values of the elasticity of substitution. These 
results have two implications. First, that the source of risk is a crucial determinant of the relationship 
between volatility and factor shares. Greater growth volatility is associated with a lower labor share 
only if it is due to greater risk in the informal sector. Second, note that in the case of a high elasticity 
of substitution, ε = 2, an increase in σu or in σv has opposite effects on SW and SL. This means that 
if only incomes in the formal sector are measured, the observed changes in factor shares following 
an increase in volatility will not reflect the true impact on the labor share.  
An increase in the risk in the formal sector reduces welfare, the reduction varying inversely 
with the elasticity of substitution. An increase in the risk in the informal sector is welfare-improving. 
The reason for this paradoxical result is that taxing the formal sector only introduces a distortion into 
the economy, making the informal sector too large relative to the formal sector.  Increasing the risk 
in the informal sector reduces the labor allocated to the informal sector, thereby correcting for this 
distortion.  In the absence of taxes in the formal sector, increasing σv is also welfare deteriorating, 
but less so than a corresponding increase in σu. 
5.3 Policy  Responses 
  Table 2 summarizes possible policy responses to increases in the two sources of risk from 
12.5% to 25% respectively, with the three panels corresponding to low, medium, and high values of 
the elasticity of substitution.  Since, as we have already seen, there is always a degree of freedom in 
the choice of tax rates, we focus on the case there the deterministic and stochastic components of 23 
income are taxed at a uniform rate.  We first consider Table 2a and shall focus on the panel 
characterized ε = 0.5, since all other cases are parallel. 
  Row 1 describes as a benchmark no policy response.  An increase in σu leads to a substantial 
reallocation of labor to the informal sector, raising the share of labor by 2.03%.  The increase in risk 
raises the mean growth rate by 0.50%, but also its volatility by 4.06%, leading to a reduction in 
welfare of 4.42%.  We have already commented that to stabilize the volatility at its original level is 
infeasible, requiring a tax on labor income of 3000%!  Stabilization of the mean growth rate is 
feasible and can be achieved in one of two ways.  First, by raising the tax on labor income by 4.36%, 
this leads to a substantial migration of labor to the informal sector, raising the overall share of labor 
by 5.56%.  The shift in labor has a modest effect on reducing volatility and while this may be 
welfare improving, it is overwhelmed by the adverse effects of the decline in the mean growth rate, 
and the welfare loss is exacerbated to 10.1%. Alternatively, the growth rate may be stabilized by 
raising the tax on capital income by 12.6%, but since this has no impact on mitigating volatility, the 
impact on welfare is even more adverse. 
  But there are more promising policy responses.  Row 3 summarizes the case where the 
government stabilizes the (gross) share of labor income by reducing the wage tax by 3.57%.  This 
increases the mean growth rate by 0.90%, while increasing the volatility only marginally more than 
in the case of the passive policy.  The net effect is that the welfare loss resulting from the higher 
production risk is reduced to 0.17%.   
  Indeed, it is possible to eliminate the welfare loss entirely.  By reducing the wage tax even 
further -- by 3.71% -- the policy maker can induce a larger modest increase in the mean growth rate 
to 0.92%, with a slightly larger volatility (4.45% rather than 4.43%).  While this results in a slight 
reduction in the overall share of income being earned by labor (-0.08%), nevertheless overall welfare 
is preserved.  Welfare can also be preserved if instead, the government reduces the tax on capital by 
10%.  In this case the mean growth rate will be increased by 0.90%, with volatility remaining at 
4.06%, but with the share of labor increasing by 2.03%.  Although these two tax policies achieve the 
same overall welfare, the former is more favorable to capital and the latter to labor.  Finally by 
combining the tax cut on labor income of 3.57% [in row 3] with a 0.35% cut in the tax on capital 24 
income, the policy maker can neutralize the effects of the higher volatility on both the distribution of 
income, as well as the overall welfare level. 
  Moving down the panels of Table 2a as the elasticity of substitution increases, the same 
pattern describing the policy responses is observed.  The case of an increase in risk in the informal 
sector, discussed in Table 2b, is analogous.  The one difference is that most of the policy responses 
will be reversed due to the fact that this form of risk induces a decrease, rather than an increase in l, 
which needs to be offset in designing the optimal policy response.   
6.  Second-Best Optimal Policy Responses 
  Thus far, the tax rates and the policy responses have been arbitrary.  We now consider the 
consequences of redistributing the tax burdens from labor to capital on the equilibrium growth rate 
and welfare.  In equilibrium, the existing (constant) tax rates on labor and capital income generate 
tax revenues equal to () () ( 1 ) () WK K ll r lK T K τδ τ −+ ≡ .  This grows with the capital stock of capital 
and enables the policy maker to finance the constant fraction,  () TB l Ω , of output.  We abstract from 
the use of this revenue.18  We shall assume that the policy maker in setting the tax rates, τW,τK, 
maintains  
    () () ( 1 ) ()
=constant
() ()
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  It is straightforward to show that if the policy maker wishes finance the constant share of 
output in (27) through taxes, then in the absence of risk, equalizing the tax rates τW = τK will 
maximize the growth rate. Thus the assumption we have made in our benchmark simulations 
(τW = τK = 0.20) corresponds to growth-maximization in a deterministic economy.  But it can also 
be shown that equalizing the tax rates does not maximize welfare in such an economy; this requires 
                                                 
18 We are implicitly assuming that the revenue raised is rebated to all individuals as a lump-sum transfer. In our current 
setup, with homogeneous agents, all individuals pay and receive the same amount.  In García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky 
(2003) we justify the use of this type of policy to attain distributional objectives when individuals differ in their capital 
endowments, in the context of a (non-stochastic) two-sector growth model. Our results in that paper, and in particular the 
fact that the distribution of endowments does not affect aggregate outcomes, implies that our present results are robust to 
the introduction of endowment heterogeneity.   25 
the tax rate on labor to be reduced below that on capital.19   
In the absence of policy constraints, that is, if both sectors could be taxed, it would be 
optimal to raise all revenue through a labor income tax since such a tax would not distort the 
allocation of labor across sectors. But the inability to tax the informal sector means that the wage tax 
reduces the labor supplied to the formal sector and consequently the marginal product of capital. 
Under these circumstances, shifting the tax burden from labor to capital has two effects: the higher 
tax on interest income reduces the net interest rate, while the lower wage tax increases employment 
in the formal sector and thus increases the marginal product of capital.  With no risk, the distortion in 
the allocation of labor due to the wage tax is large, implying that the former effect always dominates.  
  Tables 3a and 3b present numerical solutions for varying degrees of risk.  In the absence of 
risk (σ u = σ v = 0), we see that maintaining the tax rates at their equal initial levels (τW = τK = 20%) 
is growth maximizing, confirming the result just noted.  The changes in these tables are taken about 
the corresponding economy, in Tables 1a, lb, in which the tax rates are set at the baseline levels 
τW = τK = 20%.  Thus, for example, for the economy characterized by ε = 0.5,σ u = 0.125, σv = 0.25 
setting the tax rates at their respective second-best optima,  ˆ  τ  W =15.4%,ˆ  τ K = 28.9%will raise welfare 
by 0.336%, and reduce the growth rate by 0.03 percentage points, to 2.49%. 
  A number of results emerge. The second-best welfare maximizing tax policy is to reduce the 
tax on the wage rate from its initial benchmark level of 20% to around 12-15%, depending upon the 
relative importance of the two shocks, and increase the tax on capital income correspondingly.  In all 
cases this reduces the fraction of labor employed in the informal sector.  However, the impact on the 
growth rate is mild, reflecting two offsetting effects.  Whereas the increase in employment in the 
formal sector tends to raise the growth rate, the higher capital tax tends to be growth-inhibiting.  In 
the cases where the formal sector is more volatile than the informal sector, this shift toward a capital 
tax will generate an increase in aggregate volatility, though if the informal sector is more volatile, 
aggregate volatility will be reduced. Higher volatility in the formal sector is associated with a 
reduction in the optimal tax on labor income.  This is because the higher volatility decreases the 
                                                 
19 We shall discuss only second-best tax policies.  The first-best tax policy is uninteresting in this model.  Without 
distortions in the labor market it is simply to set τW = 0, while subsidizing capital so as to induce the agent to take 
account of the externality in production. 26 
desirability of working in that sector.  Higher volatility in the informal sector decreases the return to 
employment in that sector and this requires a compensating higher tax on wages in the formal sector.   
  The welfare gains from moving toward the second-best optimal tax policy are remarkably 
stable across the various configurations of risk and productivity parameters, ranging between 0.3% 
and 1.2%.  There are patterns, however.  The welfare gains increase with risk in the formal sector as 
long as ε ≤ 1, and decrease otherwise.  They decrease with risk in the informal sector and are more 
sensitive to σv than to σu.  Finally, the welfare gains increase with the elasticity of substitution 
because of the opportunity this presents for the more efficient use of productive factors.  
  Comparing Tables 3a and 3b highlights the tradeoffs between growth maximization and 
welfare maximization, and the contrasts between them.  In general, maximizing the expected growth 
rate does not coincide with welfare maximization.  The welfare gains from growth-maximizing tax 
policy range between 0.75% and –3.0%, and thus in some cases leads to welfare losses relative to the 
corresponding benchmark economy.  Maximizing the growth rate requires increasing volatility and 
thus imposes too much risk on the risk-averse representative agent.  The relative size of the informal 
sector to the formal sector in the growth-maximizing economy relative to that in the welfare-
maximizing economy, thus depends upon the relative riskiness of the two sectors.  Finally, whereas 
the optimal tax rates in a welfare-maximizing economy are rather insensitive to varying degrees of 
risk, in a growth-maximizing economy they are highly sensitive to risk, particularly to σu.  
7. Conclusions 
  Developing economies are subject to large fluctuations in the level of output and the rate of 
growth, yet little work has been done to try to understand the effect of volatility on distribution. In 
this paper, we have used an endogenous, stochastic growth model to examine the relationship 
between the volatility of growth and the factor distribution of income. Our framework incorporates 
two important features of developing economies: the co-existence of a modern and a traditional 
sector, and the fact that traditional sector employment –or at least a large part of it- takes place 
outside the formal labor market mechanism. This implies that governments cannot tax incomes 
generated in the traditional sector, and this imposes constraints on policy responses and decisions. 27 
  Our analysis shows that the relationship between volatility and the labor share is a complex 
one. First, the source of risk matters, as an increase in volatility will be associated with a lower labor 
share only if it stems from greater risk in the traditional (or informal) sector. Increased risk in the 
formal sector, on the other hand, tends to shift labor away from this sector, increasing its marginal 
product and hence its share in income. A second difficulty in characterizing this relationship is due 
to the fact that, for high values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the 
formal sector, the shares of labor in the formal sector and in the economy as a whole move in 
opposite directions in response to greater risk. This means that if only formal sector incomes can be 
measured, the observed changes in factor shares will not necessarily correspond to the true ones.  
  The government’s policy constraint provides an advantage in terms of the possible responses 
to an increase in risk.  Because only labor incomes in the formal sector can be taxed, changes in the 
wage tax affect the allocation of labor across sectors. This means that the government has two policy 
instruments: the capital income tax, which affects savings, and the wage tax, which affects sectoral 
employment. This allows the policy-maker to have two targets. By a suitable adjustment of the two 
tax rates following an increase in risk, it is possible to maintain both factor shares and welfare at 
their original levels. 
  An important question concerns the optimal tax structure in developing countries. If all labor 
incomes could be taxed, a wage tax would not distort the allocation of employment across sectors 
and it would be optimal to raise all necessary revenue through it.  However, the policy constraint 
implies that the wage tax results in a level of employment in the formal sector below the social 
optimum. This distortion has a stronger impact on the rate of return than the capital income tax, 
implying that the second-best optimal policy response requires a wage tax below the capital income 
tax. In the presence of risk, we find that optimal policy exhibits a tradeoff between growth and 
welfare. Increasing the growth rate requires increasing volatility, which imposes too much risk on 
the risk-averse representative agent. Maximizing growth thus entails a welfare loss, that increases 
with the risk in the economy.  This suggests that economic policy should encompass a wider range 
of objectives than simply the rate of growth of GDP. 28 
  We conclude by noting some caveats.  Our analysis has been based on a closed economy, in 
which agents have no access to world financial markets.  However, to the extent that agents do have 
the opportunity to invest abroad they may have an avenue for avoiding the tax on capital income as 
well as that on labor income.  Two aspects limit the strength of this effect.  First, as Rodrik and van 
Ypersele (2001) have discussed, the higher the degree of international capital mobility, the more the 
after-tax rate of return on domestic capital is tied to the world rate of interest, and the less the ability 
of the economy to set an independent tax on capital.  The access to world capital markets of a 
developing economy is likely to be low, implying that this factor would not be too large. The 
essence of our results will continue to hold, with the optimal tax policy involving a tradeoff between 
the ability to avoid the two types of income taxes. Second, a government has the power to tax the 
income of its residents, wherever it is earned.  If the returns to capital invested at home and abroad 
are taxed at the same rate, having access to international capital markets will not change our 
conclusions. 
  Another important issue concerns the nature of the formal sector and the sources of tax 
revenues.  In our analysis the formal sector is something like the manufacturing sector. Yet in some 
developing economies a major source of tax revenues is derived from the export of natural resources.  
This raises the question of how the policy implications derived in this model would extend to a 
three-sector economy consisting of say a formal sector, informal sector, and a resource-exporting 
sector.  We can conjecture that to the extent that export revenues provide a source of taxation, one 
would expect our results to generally hold, with the tax on exports substituting for the tax on labor.  
Both these aspects merit careful analysis and illustrate important directions in which our analysis can 
be usefully extended. 
 Table 1a 
 
Effects of Risk on Equilibrium:  Distributional Aspects 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1 (ε = 0.5) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  














σu = 0  28.4   82.3   67.7     73.4     0.313  28.1   82.5   67.6     73.3     0.314  27.1   83.1   67.3     72.8     0.318 
σu = 0.125  30.0   81.3   68.2     74.1     0.306  29.6   81.5   68.1     74.0     0.308  28.6   82.2   67.8     73.5     0.312 
σu = 0.25  34.4   78.3   69.6     76.2     0.289  34.1   78.6   69.5     76.0     0.290  33.0   79.3   69.1     75.5     0.294 
 
 Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  














σu = 0  45.3   71.6   60.0    71.4      0.260  44.7   72.0   60.0     71.2    0.262  42.7   73.3   60.0     70.7     0.267 
σu = 0.125  46.9   70.4   60.0    71.8      0.255  46.3    70.9    60.0    71.6    0.257  44.4   72.2   60.0     71.1     0.262 
σu = 0.25  51.3   67.4   60.0    73.0      0.242  50.7   67.8   60.0     72.9    0.245  48.9   69.1   60.0     72.4     0.249 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  














σu = 0  64.7   59.1   47.1     68.7     0.225  63.8   59.8   47.5     68.6     0.226  60.9   61.7   48.4     68.1     0.231 
σu = 0.125  66.0   58.2   46.6     68.9     0.223  65.1   58.9   47.0     68.8     0.224  62.4   60.7   47.9     68.4     0.229 
σu = 0.25  69.4   55.8   45.4     69.5     0.219  68.6   56.4   45.7     69.4     0.220  66.2   58.1   46.6     69.0     0.223 
 
NB All equilibrium quantities, except Y K  ratio, are in percentages Table 1b 
 
Effects of Risk on Equilibrium:  Growth, Volatility, and Welfare 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1 (ε = 0.5) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
σu = 0  2.16       0         0         0       -1.19  2.20     0.97    2.20     1.81   -0.84  2.31     1.87    4.22     5.79    0.15 
σu = 0.125  2.34     4.47    10.2    9.34   -2.73  2.39     4.60    10.4     9.88   -2.36  2.52     4.94    11.2     11.2   -1.33 
σu = 0.25  2.83     8.55    19.6   17..9   -7.07  2.89     8.67    19.8     18.3   -6.68  3.06     8.98    20.5     19.4   -5.54 
 
Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
σu = 0  2.40      0         0         0         0.74  2.48     1.54    3.50     4.92    1.21  2.67     2.94    6.68    9.45     2.56 
σu = 0.125  2.55     3.85    8.80    7.36   -0.48  2.63     4.19    9.58     8.99     ---  2.84     5.00    11.4    12.4     1.36 
σu = 0.25  2.90     7.30    16.9    13.8   -3.87  2.99     7.56    17.4     15.0   -3.37  3.26     8.24    18.9    17.9    -1.97 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
 
  ψ      σw       σY       σ L     ∆(X) 
σu = 0  2.76      0         0         0         3.78  2.87     2.19    5.03    7.33     4.31  3.17     4.19    9.56    14.0     5.80 
σu = 0.125  2.85     3.16    7.28    4.93     2.92  2.97     3.91    8.98    9.01     3.44  3.29     5.42    12.4    15.3     4.92 
σu = 0.25  3.09     6.03    14.0    9.11     0.53  3.23     6.54    15.1    12.2     1.04  3.60     7.78    17.9    18.1     2.47 
 
NB All equilibrium quantities are in percentages.  Welfare Changes are measured relative to the benchmark σu = σv = 0.125,  ε = 1. Table 2a 
 
Policy Responses to Increase in σu from 0.125 to 0.25 
 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1( ε = 0.5) 
 
         
∆τw        ∆τ k 
    
∆SL     ∆ψ     ∆σ w    ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4.    Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
5a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5b.  Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0             0 
 4.36           0 
    0            12.6 
-3.57           0 
-3.71           0 
     0          -10.0 
-3.57        -0.35 
2.03     0.50   4.06   -4.42 
5.56       0     3.58    -10.1 
2.03        0     4.06   -10.4 
    0      0.90   4.43    -0.17 
-0.08   0.92   4.45          0 
2.03    0.90    4.06         0 
    0      0.92   4.43         0 
 
 
Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
         
∆τw        ∆τ k 
    
∆SL     ∆ψ     ∆σ w    ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4.    Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
5a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5b.  Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0             0 
 4.23           0 
    0            8.21 
-3.05           0 
-3.62           0 
     0          -7.22 
-3.05        -1.06 
1.04     0.37   3.37   -3.37 
3.48        0     2.87   -7.48 
1.21        0     3.37   -7.40 
    0      0.64   3.72    -0.52 
-0.23   0.70   3.79          0 
 1.21    0.69   3.37         0 
    0      0.69   3.72         0 
 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
         
∆τw        ∆τ k 
    
∆SL     ∆ψ     ∆σ w    ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4.    Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
5a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5b.  Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0             0 
 4.71           0 
    0            5.05 
-2.50           0 
-3.63           0 
     0          -4.77 
-2.50        -1.45 
0.57     0.26   2.63   -2.32 
1.57        0     2.22   -5.30 
0.57        0     2.63    -4.87 
    0      0.41   2.88    -0.72 
-0.27   0.48   3.00          0 
 0.57    0.50   2.63         0 
    0      0.48   2.88         0 
 Table 2b 
 
Policy Responses to Increase in σv from 0.125 to 0.25 
 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1( ε = 0.5) 
 
         
∆τw     ∆τ k 
    ∆SL       ∆ψ       ∆σ w      ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
4b.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5.    Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0            0 
1.350         0 
    0        2.735 
0.767         0 
0.834         0 
     0       1.997 
0.767     0.165 
-0.461   0.126   0.338    1.055 
 0.352       0      0.318   -0.663 
-0.461       0      0.338   -0.393    
    0        0.055   0.327    0.086 
 0.040    0.048   0.326       0 
-0461    0.034   0.338        0 
    0         0.047   0.327      0 
 
 
Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
 
         
∆τw     ∆τ k 
    ∆SL       ∆ψ       ∆σ w      ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
4b.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5.    Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0            0 
3.247         0 
    0        4.240 
1.200         0 
1.373         0 
     0       2.256 
1.200     0.333 
-0.515   0.212   0.808    1.363 
 0.871       0      0.864   -1.893 
-0.515       0      0.808   -0.906    
    0        0.133   0.826    0.173 
 0.074    0.122   0.829       0 
-0.515    0.084   0.808       0 
    0         0.117   0.826      0 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
         
∆τw     ∆τ k 
    ∆SL       ∆ψ       ∆σ w      ∆X  
1.    Passive response 
2a.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τw) 
2b.  Maintain fixed growth rate (adjusting τk) 
3.    Maintain fixed shares (adjusting τw) 
4a.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τw) 
4b.  Maintain fixed welfare  (adjusting τk) 
5.    Maintain fixed shares and welfare 
    0            0 
9.849         0 
    0        5.907 
1.690         0 
2.207         0 
     0       2.270 
1.690     0.508 
-0.431   0.323   1.515    1.430 
 1.866       0      1.979   -5.254 
-0.431       0      1.515   -1.738    
    0        0.263   1.596    0.263 
 0.095    0.250   1.615       0 
-0.430    0.176   1.515       0 
    0         0.236   1.596      0 
 
 Table 3a 
 
Second Best Optimal Policy:  Welfare Maximization 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1 (ε = 0.5) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  19.3   13.3   32.5   -0.039   0.000   0.736  19.8   13.8   31.6   -0.049  -0.287   0.611  21.2   15.5   28.6   -0.062  -0.405   0.317 
σu = 0.125  20.8   13.1   33.1    0.007   0.383   0.764  21.4   13.7   32.0   -0.006   0.283   0.637  22.7   15.4   28.9   -0.032   0.087   0.336 
σu = 0.25  25.3   12.6   34.9    0.149   0.797   0.847  25.6   13.1   33.9    0.123   0.699   0.714  26.9   14.9   30.5    0.058   0.425   0.395 
 
 Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  32.6   13.0   30.5   -0.059   0.000   1.022  32.9   13.5   29.8   -0.078  -0.403   0.862  34.4   15.2   27.2   -0.104  -0.576   0.477 
σu = 0.125  34.5   12.8   30.8   -0.002   0.520   1.023  34.8   13.3   30.1   -0.025   0.326   0.866  36.0   15.0   27.5   -0.068  -0.032   0.488 
σu = 0.25  39.8   12.3   31.6    0.151   0.997   1.025  40.0   12.8   30.8    0.117   0.834   0.877  40.8   14.5   28.3    0.037   0.439   0.515 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  49.7   12.5   28.0   -0.077   0.000   1.158  50.0   13.1   27.3   -0.104  -0.472   1.005  50.2   14.6   25.7   -0.159  -0.736   0.614 
σu = 0.125  51.9   12.4   27.9   -0.019   0.585   1.126  51.9   12.9   27.4   -0.051   0.244   0.980  52.0   14.4   25.8   -0.118  -0.247   0.608 
σu = 0.25  57.3   12.1   27.7    0.117   1.030   1.043  57.1   12.5   27.4    0.081   0.807   0.917  56.9   14.0   25.9   -0.007   0.321   0.588 
 
NB the optimal tax rates,  ˆ  τ  w, ˆ  τ k, and labor allocation, ˆ  l , are in percentages; d ˆ  ψ ,d ˆ  σ  are in percentage point changes; d ˆ  X  is in percentage changes 
 Table 3b 
 
Second Best Optimal Policy:  Growth Maximization 
 
Low elasticity of Substitution:ρ =1 (ε = 0.5) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  28.4   20.0   20.0        0           0           0  30.2   21.5   16.8    0.002   0.071  -0.350  35.4   26.1   5.83    0.033   0.569  -1.579 
σu = 0.125  24.6   16.0   28.0    0.014   0.228   0.634  26.3   17.5   25.1    0.005   0.116   0.410  31.7   22.3   15.0    0.004  -0.032  -0.435 
σu = 0.25  11.9     1.2   52.0    0.226   1.852  -0.783  13.7     2.9   49.7    0.184   1.616  -0.626  19.2     8.3   41.7    0.084   0.955  -0.172 
 
 Cobb-Douglas: ρ = 0( ε = 1)  
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  45.3   20.0   20.0        0           0           0  47.7   21.8   17.3    0.004   0.104  -0.530  54.8   27.6   8.60    0.062   0.829  -2.527 
σu = 0.125  41.1   16.5   25.3    0.013   0.250   0.747  43.8   18.5   22.3    0.003   0.067   0.342  51.2   24.4   13.4    0.019   0.081  -1.189 
σu = 0.25  23.9     2.9   45.7    0.218   2.247  -0.577  27.3     5.1   42.4    0.160   1.777  -0.195  37.5   12.3   31.6    0.040   0.632   0.435 
 
High Elasticity of Substitution:ρ = −0.5 (ε = 2) 
 
  σv = 0  σv = 0.125  σv = 0.25 
  
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
 
   ˆ  l         ˆ  τ w       ˆ  τ k       d ˆ  ψ          d ˆ  σ         d ˆ  X  
σu = 0  64.7   20.0   20.0        0           0           0  67.5   22.3   18.0    0.006   0.128  -0.681  74.3   29.0   13.2    0.089   0.919  -2.986 
σu = 0.125  61.1   17.1   22.7    0.009   0.206   0.663  64.3   19.5   20.4    0.000   0.013   0.124  72.1   26.6   14.8    0.044   0.316  -1.939 
σu = 0.25  44.6     5.7   36.0    0.151   2.036   0.229  49.9     8.7   32.0    0.093   1.301   0.638  63.0   17.8   22.0    0.004   0.102   0.344 
 
NB the optimal tax rates,  ˆ  τ  w, ˆ  τ k, and labor allocation, ˆ  l , are in percentages; d ˆ  ψ ,d ˆ  σ  are in percentage point changes; d ˆ  X  is in percentage changes 
 A.1 
Appendix 
  This Appendix provides some of the technical details underlying the derivation of the 
equilibrium conditions (13a) - (13j), which is based on the concept of a “recursive competitive 
equilibrium” due to Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp. 479-480).  The critical feature of this equilibrium is 
that the value function, as well as the optimal policies, is part of the equilibrium.  This has the 
desirable feature that the equilibrium conditions -- which with identical agents includes the equality 
of individual and aggregate quantities -- can be substituted into the value function.  This determines 
an equilibrium value function which then depends upon only one state variable, and can be readily 
solved, in contrast to the intractability usually encountered when two state variables are present. 
  The representative agent's stochastic optimization problem is to choose his individual 
consumption-wealth ratio, the fraction of time devoted to formal sector and to the informal sector, 
and portfolio shares to maximize: 
1
() 1 , 0 1 ,
t
o EC t e d t
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subject to his individual constraints: 
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Since the individual perceives two state variables,  , WW, we consider a value function of the form 
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The differential generator of the value function  (,, ) VWWt is 
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where we shall assume that with all agents being identical, the aggregate and individual proportional 
shocks are identical and perfectly correlated. 
  The individual's formal optimization problem is to choose C,l,nB,nK to maximize the 
Lagrangian expression 
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βγ β λ
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In doing this he takes the evolution of the aggregate variables and the externality they generate as 
given.  Taking the partial derivative with respect to C,l,nB,nK, and canceling 
t e
β − , yields 
   C
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where  
   {} (1 ) lW K
W
du du qdv n
W
δτ ′ ≡− − +        ( A . 4 e )  A.3 
  In addition, the value function must satisfy the Bellman equation 
    
1
max ( , ) 0
tt eC e X W W
βγ β
γ
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     (A.3') 
Being a function of two state variables, the Bellman equation is a partial differential equation in the 
individual and aggregate wealth, W and W , which recalling Ψ , (A.1b) and (A.1b') can be written:  
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++     (A.6) 
The next step is to take the partial derivative with respect to W of the Bellman equation (A.6), noting 
that nM,l  are independent of W, while through the optimality condition (A.4a), C is a function of W.  
This yields the following condition: 
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Consider now  (,) WW X XW W = .  Taking the stochastic differential of this quantity yields: 
 
22 11
() () () ()
22
W WW WWW WW WWW WWW dX X dW X dW X dW X dW dW X dW =++ + +  (A.8) 
Taking expected values of (A.8), dividing by dt, and substituting the resulting equation along with 
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 −+ + + + + =   ∂∂ 
 (A.9) 
where φ ≡ nBrB + nK(1 −τ K)r K 
  The solution to this equation is by trial and error.  Given the form of the objective function, 
we propose a value function of the form: A.4 
    
22 (,) X WW c W W
γ γγ − =       ( A . 1 0 )  
where the parameters γ,γ 2 are to be determined.  From (A.10) we obtain: 
    22 ( ) ; ;  W W X XW X XW γγ γ =− =  
22
22 2 2 () ( 1 ) ;  ( 1 ) ;   ()   WW WW WW X XW X XW X XW W γβγβ γ γ γ γγ =− − − = − = −  (A.11) 
Since our concern is solving for the macroeconomic equilibrium, we shall impose the following 
equilibrium conditions: 
    ,   , ;        ii nniB K WW == = ; and hence 
2
ww w σ σ =      (A.12) 
which by the nature of the recursive competitive equilibrium can eventually be substituted into the 
equilibrium value function. 
  We now consider 
2 , ww w WW σσ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ .  From (A.1d) we obtain 
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WW W
τ τδ σ σ
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
   (A.13) 
Differentiating (A.13) with respect to W , while noting the stochastic component of the government 
budget constraint 
    () (1 ) (1 ) BB B K K K K K W B nd u n r l nr n l d u nq l d v δτ δ τ ′′ =+ − ++ − +    (A.14) 
we find that in equilibrium 
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 (A.15a) 
Likewise, we find A.5 








       ( A . 1 5 b )  
Substituting (A.15a) and (A.15b) into (A.9), leads to: 













=− + − +   ∂  
      ( A . 1 6 )  
Substituting for (A.13) and (A.15a), and recalling the definition of rK, this can be expressed in terms 
of the underlying stochastic shocks 
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22 2 ()
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22 2 (2 ) (1 )(1 (1 ) ) (1 ) K WK u v K v Bn n q l q l n
ρ τ ασ σ ′  +Ω − − − − − Ω + −     (A.17) 
Now returning to (A.4a) and computing the stochastic differential of this relationship and taking 
expected values yields: 
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      ( A . 1 8 )  
Focusing on a balanced growth path along which C W is constant,  




ψ =≡+   
we may write: 
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γ ψγγ σ =− + − −      ( A . 1 9 )  
Equating (A.17) and (A.19) we may express the mean growth rate as: 
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   (A.20) A.6 
This is the equilibrium growth rate relationship given by (13j) in the text.  
Combining (A.20) with (A.1b), we can express the equilibrium consumption-wealth ratio as 




φ τδ ψ =+ − −+ −      ( A . 2 1 )  
  Substituting (A.14) into (A.1d), and using the equilibrium condition the equilibrium 
stochastic component of wealth is  
    ( ) dw B l du qldv =Ω +         ( A . 1 d ’ )  
implying that the variance is: 
   
222 2 2 2 2 () 2 () wu u v v B lB l q l q l σ σσ σ =Ω +Ω +      ( A . 2 2 )  
This is equation (13i) of the text.   
  Substituting the equilibrium conditions into (A.4e) the stochastic shock to wages is 
   { } (1 ) lW K du du qdv n δτ ′ ≡− − +       ( A . 4 e ’ )  
Combining this with (A.1d’) in (A.4c) yields the equilibrium labor allocation condition (13e): 
( )
22 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) WW u W u v v qB B l q q l δ τγ δ τ σ δ τ σ σ ′′  −− = − Ω − − Ω −− −     (A.23a)   
In addition, substituting (A.1d’) and (A.14) into (A.4c) and (A.4d), and subtracting, leads to the 
equilibrium portfolio allocation condition (13f): 
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1
K
BK K w u u v K KW K K
K
n
rr B q l r l r
n
τγ σσ σ τ τ δ τ
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  (A.23b) 
Finally, the consumer budget constraint (13g) is obtained directly from the deterministic component 
of (9a), while the goods market equilibrium condition (13h) follows directly from the deterministic 
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